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The Exclusion Trap for Women Refugee 
Claimants who Escape Domestic 
Violence with Children
KATHERINE TESS SHELLEY* 
Women who escape domestic violence with their children are being denied refugee status in 
Canada on the grounds that, by fleeing with their children, they have committed the crime of 
child abduction. Article 1(F)(b) of the 1951 Refugee Convention, which has been imported into 
Canadian law, specifies that individuals who have committed serious, non-political crimes 
are excluded from the protections associated with being a legal refugee. Consequently, 
women who travel to Canada with their children risk the denial of their refugee claims solely 
because they chose not to abandon their children in an abusive or potentially dangerous 
situation. In this article, I examine publicly available Federal Court and Immigration and 
Refugee Board decisions from 2000–2017 where the 1(F)(b) exclusion was raised on the basis 
of the crime of child abduction. More specifically, I focus my analysis on cases where the 1(F)
(b) exclusion was raised as an issue in women’s refugee claims based on domestic violence. 
Domestic violence is the form of gender-related persecution most frequently cited as the 
basis for a refugee claim and presents special significance in the context of allegations of 
child abduction. Of additional concern for women in this situation is the interaction between 
their claims and applications for the return of a child under the Hague Convention on the Civil 
Aspects of International Child Abduction. Ultimately, I conclude there are serious fairness and 
justice concerns around how decision makers have applied guidelines for women refugee 
claimants, conducted credibility assessments, and addressed interplay between Hague 
Convention applications and refugee claims in these cases.
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IN MARCH 2001, MIKLOSNE KOVACS LEFT HUNGARY for Canada with her 
three-year-old son, Gergo, and fourteen-year-old daughter, Annet. Ms. Kovacs’s 
departure from Hungary was allegedly prompted by years of physical and 
emotional abuse by her husband. Upon arrival at Toronto’s Pearson International 
Airport, she claimed refugee status for herself and on behalf of her children. The 
legal ramifications of Ms. Kovacs’s decision to leave Hungary with her children 
would play out over the next four years in decisions by the Immigration and 
Refugee Board (IRB), the Ontario Superior Court of Justice, and the Federal 
Court.1 Though Ms. Kovacs chose to escape with—and arguably rescue—her 
children from a violent situation, she was ultimately denied refugee status on the 
grounds that her actions constituted child abduction, “a serious non-political 
crime” that excludes a claimant from refugee status under the Convention Relating 
to the Status of Refugees (“Refugee Convention”).2
Ms. Kovacs is not alone. Since 2005, a significant number of women have 
been denied refugee status in Canada on the grounds that, in fleeing domestic 
violence and other dangerous situations with their children, they were purportedly 
guilty of child abduction. This is a trap created by the combined effect of how 
Canadian law defines refugees, how adjudicators analyze these claims, how 
domestic violence is understood, and in some cases, how civil remedies for the 
return of children taken across borders interact with refugee claims. Moreover, 
Ms. Kovacs’s case prompted the Federal Court to set a precedent for courts dealing 
1. Kovacs v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2004] RPDD No 798 (QL) 
[Kovacs v Canada (RPD)]; Kovacs v Kovacs, [2002] 59 OR (3d) 671, 212 DLR (4th) 711(Sup 
Ct) [Kovacs v Kovacs]; Kovacs v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2005 FC 
1473, 137 ACWS (3d) 802 [Kovacs v Canada].
2. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 28 July 1951, 189 UNTS 137 art 1(F)(b) 
(entered into force 22 April 1954, accession by Canada 4 June 1969) [Refugee Convention].
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with the 1(F)(b) exclusion based on alleged child abduction where there has been 
a return application under the Convention on the Civil Aspects of International 
Child Abduction (“Hague Convention”).3 As a result, domestic violence survivors 
who travel to Canada with their children risk the denial of their refugee claims 
solely because they chose not to abandon their children in abusive situations.
The intersection of 1(F)(b) exclusion on the basis of child abduction with 
domestic violence is a topic that has received limited attention in the academic 
literature to date. By contrast, the two constituent parts of this intersection have 
attracted attention. Substantial work has been done to analyze the structural 
barriers and inequalities faced by women refugee claimants, including those 
who base their claim on domestic violence.4 Separately, a body of academic 
literature has assessed changes over time in the use of the Hague Convention and 
its ramifications for women who leave situations of domestic violence with their 
children.5 There is very limited academic commentary that combines these bodies 
of work to look at their intersection—specifically, women who have fled domestic 
violence and are excluded from refugee status on the basis of child abduction.6
3. Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, 25 October 1980, Can TS 
1983 No 35 [Hague Convention].
4. See e.g. Constance MacIntosh, “Domestic Violence and Gender-Based Persecution: 
How Refugee Adjudicators Judge Women Seeking Refuge from Spousal Violence—and 
Why Reform Is Needed” (2010) 26:2 Refugee 147; Efrat Arbel, “The Culture of Rights 
Protection in Canadian Refugee Law: Examining the Domestic Violence Cases” (2013) 
58:3 McGill LJ 729.
5. Karen Brown Williams, “Fleeing Domestic Violence: A Proposal to Change the Inadequacies 
of the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction in 
Domestic Violence Cases” (2011) 4 John Marshall LJ 39 at 44; Brian Quillen, “The New 
Face of International Child Abduction: Domestic-Violence Victims and Their Treatment 
Under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction” 
(2014) 49 Tex Intl LJ 621; Noah L Browne, “Relevance and Fairness: Protecting the Rights 
of Domestic Violence Victims and Left-Behind Fathers Under the Hague Convention 
on International Child Abduction” (2011) 60:5 Duke LJ 1193; Efrat Arbel, Catherine 
Dauvergne & Jenni Milbank, eds, Gender in Refugee Law: From the Margins to the Centre 
(New York: Routledge, 2014).
6. In my initial review of the literature, I was not able to find academic commentary that 
combined these bodies of work to look at their intersection—specifically, women who have 
fled domestic violence and are excluded from refugee status on the basis of child abduction. 
While this article was in its final stages of editing, the following article was published: 
Michelle Hayman, “Domestic Violence and International Child Abduction at the Border 
of Canadian Family and Refugee Law” (2018) 29 J L & Soc Pol’y 114. Michelle Hayman 
addresses the interaction of the Hague Convention with Canadian refugee law in the context 
of domestic violence and child abduction.
`
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In this article, I analyze the publicly available Federal Court and IRB decisions 
from 2000 to 2017 where the 1(F)(b) exclusion on the basis of the crime of child 
abduction was raised as an issue in assessing a woman’s refugee claim based on 
domestic violence. I argue that this legal intersection creates an untenable position 
for women experiencing domestic violence, who risk the failure of their refugee 
claim because of their understandable decision not to abandon their children in 
potentially violent situations. While the number of publicly available decisions 
limits the conclusions that can be drawn, there are troubling patterns. I identify 
fairness and justice concerns around the way decision makers have applied 
guidelines for women refugee claimants, conducted credibility assessments, and 
addressed interplay between applications of the Hague Convention and refugee 
claims in this context.
In Part I of this article, I chart the legal context for this issue—specifically, the 
1(F)(b) exclusion analysis under the Refugee Convention and the Hague Convention. 
I also set out the IRB’s Chairperson Guidelines 4: Women Refugee Claimants Fearing 
Gender-Related Persecution (“Gender Guidelines”), which provide guidance for IRB 
decision makers encountering women refugee claimants.7 In Part II, I present the 
article’s methodology and limitations. In Part III, I turn to the body of publicly 
accessible case law and analyze how courts have considered the 1(F)(b) exclusion 
analysis where child abduction is raised in refugee claims made by women on the 
basis of domestic violence. I examine the use of the Gender Guidelines by the IRB 
and Federal Court decision makers in this context. I also analyze how courts have 
addressed the interaction between these claims and applications for the return of 
a child under the Hague Convention. I conclude that there are fairness and justice 
concerns around how decision makers have applied guidelines for women refugee 
claimants, conducted credibility assessments, and addressed interplay with Hague 
Convention applications. While the sample size is limited, I also found some 
consistency issues in the jurisprudence. I close with conclusions and preliminary 
recommendations.
I. CONTEXT
One of the challenges in understanding the predicament of domestic violence 
survivors who travel to Canada with their children and seek refugee status is 
the multiplicity of international and domestic legal frameworks, non-binding 
7. Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Chairperson Guidelines 4: Women Refugee 
Claimants Fearing Gender-Related Persecution (Ottawa: Immigration and Refugee Board, 
1996), online: <www.irb-cisr.gc.ca/en/legal-policy/policies/Pages/GuideDir04.aspx> [Gender 
Guidelines]; Arbel, supra note 4 at 731.
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guidelines, and procedures that interact with each other and may have an 
effect on their lives and claims. In Parts I(A) and I(B), I focus on the exclusion 
provisions of the 1951 Refugee Convention, their adoption into Canadian law, and 
how this legal framework applies to women in the above situation. I also outline 
the IRB’s Gender Guidelines for women refugee claimants fearing gender-related 
persecution, which are intended to provide guidance for IRB decision makers 
encountering these types of situations.8 Finally, in Part I(C), I discuss the 
1980 Hague Convention. By delineating who is excluded from being a refugee 
and by creating a civil remedy for the return of children taken across borders, 
these international instruments lay the legal foundation for women refugee 
claimants who have entered Canada with their children and are fundamental in 
understanding their predicament.
A. THE REFUGEE CONVENTION, EXCLUSION, AND CANADIAN LAW
Article 14 of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights recognizes the right 
of all persons “to seek and enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution.”9 
The 1951 Refugee Convention is the key legal document that defines who is a 
refugee, what their rights are, and states’ legal obligations towards them. The 
Refugee Convention defines a refugee as someone who, “owing to a well-founded 
fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a 
particular social group or political opinion,” is unable or unwilling to return to the 
country of their nationality or habitual residence.10 Gender is not specified among 
the enumerated grounds of persecution.11 Claimants must further demonstrate 
that their home state is unable or unwilling to protect them and that they have 
no internal flight alternative within their home state.12 The definition of a refugee 
in article 1(A)(2) of the Refugee Convention has been incorporated into Canadian 
domestic law in section 96 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA).13
8. Gender Guidelines, supra note 7.
9. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “Introductory Note” in Convention and 
Protocols Relating to the Status of Refugees (Geneva: UNHCR, 2010) at 2, online: <www.
unhcr.org/protection/basic/3b66c2aa10/convention-protocol-relating-status-refugees.html>; 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 10 December 1948, UN GA Res 217 A(III) art 14.
10. Refugee Convention, supra note 2, art 1(A)(2).
11. Melanie Randall, “Particularized Social Groups and Categorical Imperatives in Refugee Law: 
State Failures to Recognize Gender and the Legal Reception of Gender Persecution Claims in 
Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States” (2015) 23:4 Am UJ Gender Soc Pol’y 
& L 529 at 531 [Randall, “Particularized Social Groups”].
12. Arbel, supra note 4 at 734, n 7.
13. Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, c 27, s 96 [IRPA].
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In addition to the above analysis, a decision maker will consider article 1(F) 
(the “exclusion clause”) of the Refugee Convention, which bars certain categories 
of individuals from refugee protection on the basis that the commission of 
certain acts “prevents access to the protections which would otherwise be 
afforded.”14 Specifically, article 1(F)(b) stipulates that an individual who has 
committed “a serious non-political crime” outside the country of refuge is not 
entitled to the protections associated with being a legal refugee.15 It reflects the 
larger idea that “certain persons do not deserve protection as refugees by reason 
of serious transgressions committed, in principle, prior to seeking asylum.”16 The 
exclusion clause is incorporated directly into Canadian law through section 98 
of the IRPA—for Canadian purposes, a person excluded by article 1(F) is “not a 
Convention refugee or a person in need of protection.”17 Such an individual is 
also barred from obtaining permanent resident status, though they may apply for 
protection in the event of a removal order.18
The exclusion clause is not intended to rule out those who are guilty of 
minor infractions. Whether a crime is sufficiently serious to fall within the 
purview of article 1(F)(b) is “determined in accordance with international norms, 
domestic legislation, and case law.”19 Specifically, in the context of the IRPA, 
“serious crime” is understood to mean an indictable offence under the Criminal 
Code that, if committed in Canada, would constitute an offence punishable by 
a maximum term of imprisonment of at least ten years.20 Lesser penalties may 
qualify depending on the circumstances and nature of the crime committed. 
Examples of “serious crimes” in the 1(F)(b) context include murder,21 drug 
14. Jennifer Bond, “Excluding Justice: The Dangerous Intersection between Refugee Claims, 
Criminal Law, and ‘Guilty’ Asylum Seekers” (2012) 24:1 Intl J Refugee L 37 at 39.
15. Refugee Convention, supra note 2, art 1(F)(b).
16. Michael Kingsley Nyinah, “Exclusion Under Article 1F: Some Reflections on Context, 
Principles and Practice” (2000) 12 Intl J Refugee L 295 at 297.
17. IRPA, supra note 13, s 98; Jayasekara v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 
2008 FCA 404 at para 2, [2009] 4 FCR 164 [Jayasekara].
18. Jayasekara, supra note 17 at para 3.
19. James Billingsley, “No Second Chances: The Default Exclusion of Refugee Claimants 
on Grounds of Serious Criminality: A Case Comment on Febles v Canada” (2015) 20 
Appeal 99 at 101.
20. IRPA, supra note 13, s 101(2)(b).
21. Feimi v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2012 FC 262, [2013] 4 FCR 345; 
AC v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2003 FC 1500, 243 FTR 194.
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trafficking,22 sexual assault,23 bombing,24 kidnapping,25 armed robbery,26 and 
terrorist acts.27 Some economic crimes (e.g., smuggling, embezzlement, fraud) 
can also be crimes under article 1(F)(b).28
In Jayasekara v Canada, the Federal Court of Appeal held that interpreting 
the seriousness of a crime in the context of 1(F)(b) requires an evaluation of “the 
elements of the crime, the mode of prosecution, the penalty prescribed, the facts 
and the mitigating and aggravating circumstances underlying the conviction.”29 
More recently, in Febles v Canada, the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) upheld 
the view that a crime will be considered serious where a maximum sentence of 
ten years or more could have been imposed, though it did state that a claimant 
whose crime would fall at the less serious end of the range in Canada should not 
be presumptively excluded and that “the ten-year rule should not be applied in a 
mechanistic, decontextualized, or unjust manner.”30
Significantly, in determining the seriousness of a crime for the purposes 
of 1(F)(b) in Canadian law, there is no balancing with factors extraneous 
to the facts and circumstances underlying the conviction, such as the risk of 
persecution in the state of origin.31 This is a departure from the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) process, which advocates for a 
proportionality assessment weighing “the gravity of the offence for which the 
individual appears to be responsible against the possible consequences of the 
22. Jayasekara, supra note 17; Martinez Cuero v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 
2012 FC 191, 405 FTR 132; Poggio Guerrero v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and 
Immigration), 2010 FC 384, 223 ACWS (3d) 181.
23. Shamlou v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (1995), 103 FTR 241, 
59 ACWS (3d) 494.
24. Gil v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1995] 1 FC 508, 119 DLR 
(4th) 497 (CA).
25. Taleb v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 90 ACWS (3d) 447, 1999 
CarswellNat 1492 (FCTD).
26. Ospina Velasquez v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2013 FC 273, 429 
FTR 143; Sharma v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2003 FTR 24, 
121 ACWS (3d) 925.
27. Zrig v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2003 FCA 178, [2003] 3 FC 761.
28. See e.g. Xie v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2004 FCA 250, [2005] 1 
FCR 304; Lai v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2005 FCA 125, 253 
DLR (4th) 606; Zeng v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2008 FC 956, 
333 FTR 84; Iliev v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2005 FC 395, 
138 ACWS (3d) 344.
29. Jayasekara, supra note 17 at para 44.
30. Febles v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 SCC 68 at para 62, [2014] 3 
SCR 431 [Febles].
31. Jayasekara, supra note 17 at para 44.
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person being excluded, notably including the degree of persecution feared.”32 
In Febles, the SCC confirmed that “the seriousness of the crime [should not] be 
balanced against factors extraneous to the crime such as present or future danger 
to the host society or post-crime rehabilitation or expiation.”33 Thus, the decision 
maker should not consider (as the UNHCR encourages34) whether a person who 
has committed a crime within the scope of article 1(F)(b) is deserving of refugee 
protection, having regard to the seriousness of the offence, post-offence activities, 
and other factors.
The abduction of a child has—unsurprisingly—been found in the past to 
be a serious non-political crime within the scope of 1(F)(b). The IRB publishes 
a public document entitled Interpretation of the Convention Refugee Definition 
in the Case Law, which lays out guidelines for the application of article 1(F)(b), 
including guidelines for determining whether a crime is “serious.”35 Citing Kovacs 
v Canada, it states that “[i]nternational kidnapping of a child may constitute a 
serious non-political crime.”36 Canadian law concerning the abduction of children 
is found in sections 280 to 286 of the Criminal Code. Specifically, section 283 
(the section I found cited in the cases reviewed for this article) provides that 
abduction by a parent or guardian is an offence leading to a term of imprisonment 
of up to ten years.37 However, it is important to note that sections 282 and 283 
are hybrid offences. The Crown could elect to proceed by either indictment or 
summary conviction. If indictable, a conviction under these provisions attracts 
a sentence not exceeding ten years, as prescribed in section 282(1)(a) or section 
283(1)(a).38 There is no minimum sentence where the Crown elects to proceed by 
summary conviction.39 In such a circumstance, section 787 of the Criminal Code 
applies so as to limit the maximum sentence to six months of imprisonment, 
32. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Background Note on the 
Application of the Exclusion Clauses: Article 1F of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of 
Refugees (Geneva: UNHCR, 2003) at para 78 [Background Note].
33. Febles, supra note 30 at para 60. See Billingsley, supra note 19.
34. Background Note, supra note 32 at para 34.
35. Immigration and Refugee Board, Interpretation of the Convention Refugee Definition in the 
Case Law (Ottawa: IRB, 2018), online: <www.irb-cisr.gc.ca/en/legal-policy/legal-concepts/
Pages/RefDef.aspx>.
36. Ibid, s 11.3.1.
37. Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46, s 283 [Criminal Code].
38. Ibid, ss 282(1)(a), 283(1)(a); AB v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2016 
FC 1385 at para 74, [2017] 4 FCR 3 [AB v Canada].
39. Criminal Code, supra note 37, ss 282(1)(b), 283(a)(b); AB v Canada, supra 
note 38 at para 74.
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a fine of five thousand dollars, or both.40 Per Jayasekara, the choice of mode or 
prosecution can be relevant to the court’s analysis of seriousness where, as here, 
there is a “substantial difference” between the prescribed penalties for summary 
and indictable offences.41
While the presumption of the seriousness of a crime may be rebutted by 
the factors taken into account under the Jayasekara analysis, defences are also 
available. For example, no one shall be found guilty of the taking of a young 
person if the court is satisfied that the taking was necessary in order “to protect 
the young person from danger of imminent harm or if the person charged with 
the offence was escaping from danger of imminent harm.”42
B. CANADA’S INNOVATION: THE GENDER GUIDELINES
That current-day women seeking sanctuary in Canada can base their refugee claims 
on domestic violence perpetrated by non-state actors is a function of the Gender 
Guidelines.43 Initially released by the IRB in 1993, the Gender Guidelines link 
gender to the definition of a refugee and lay out a framework for the assessment 
of a refugee claim in a gender-sensitive manner (though they did not, as many 
refugee advocates desired, add gender as an explicit ground).44 Canada was the 
first state signatory to the Refugee Convention to address the Convention’s failure 
to account for gender when defining who was entitled to refugee protections.45
The Gender Guidelines are significant to the topic of this paper—refugee 
claims brought by women who escape domestic violence with their children—
because they affect how decision makers should be treating these women’s claims. 
While the Gender Guidelines do not independently have the force of legislation, 
the IRB requires its members to furnish written reasons for decisions that reject 
the principles in the Gender Guidelines.46 Failure to consider the Gender Guidelines 
40. Criminal Code, supra note 36, s 787; AB v Canada, supra note 38 at para 74.
41. Jayasekara, supra note 17 at para 46.
42. Criminal Code, supra note 37, s 285.
43. Gender Guidelines, supra note 7; Arbel, supra note 4 at 731.
44. Sherene Razack, “Domestic Violence as Gender Persecution: Policing the Borders of 
Nation, Race, and Gender” (1995) 8 CJWL 45 at 61; Randall, “Particularized Social 
Groups,” supra note 11.
45. Shauna Labman & Catherine Dauvergne, “Evaluating Canada’s approach to gender-related 
persecution: Revisiting and re-embracing ‘refugee women and the imperative of categories’” 
in Arbel, Dauvergne & Milbank, supra note 5 at 264.
46. Arbel, supra note 4 at 734-35.
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is a palpable error,47 and while the Gender Guidelines “need not be specifically 
mentioned in a decision … it must be apparent from the decision that it was 
considered.”48 Consideration of the Gender Guidelines is reviewed on a standard 
of reasonableness.49 Elements of the Gender Guidelines have been incorporated 
into the jurisprudence around refugee claims and are widely referenced in claims 
involving domestic violence.
The Gender Guidelines affect how IRB decision makers should take gender 
into account as they follow the steps of the refugee claim assessment.50 The 
Gender Guidelines recognize that “[t]he circumstances which give rise to women’s 
fear of persecution are often unique to women.”51 They direct decision makers 
to consider “the social, cultural, religious, and economic context in which the 
claimant finds herself ” when assessing the feared harm and deciding whether it 
is “objectively unreasonable for the claimant not to have sought the protection 
of the state.”52
The Gender Guidelines also address gender-specific evidentiary concerns 
and the distinct difficulties women may face at a refugee hearing.53 They note 
that “[w]omen refugee claimants face special problems in demonstrating that 
their claims are credible and trustworthy.”54 Examples given include: “[w]omen 
from societies where the preservation of one’s virginity or marital dignity is the 
cultural norm may be reluctant to disclose their experiences of sexual violence”; 
“[w]omen refugee claimants who have suffered sexual violence may exhibit a 
pattern of symptoms referred to as Rape Trauma Syndrome”; and “women who 
have been subjected to domestic violence may exhibit a pattern of symptoms 
referred to as Battered Woman Syndrome and may also be reluctant to testify.”55
47. Njeri v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2009 FC 291 at para 16, 176 
ACWS (3d) 505; Aissa v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FC 1156 at 
para 35, 253 ACWS (3d) 175.
48. Aissa, supra note 47 at para 61.
49. Correa Juarez v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2010 FC 890 at para 12, 
193 ACWS (3d) 957.
50. Razack, supra note 44 at 63.
51. Gender Guidelines, supra note 7, s B.
52. Ibid, s C.
53. Razack, supra note 44 at 61.
54. Gender Guidelines, supra note 7, s D.
55. Ibid.
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C. THE HAGUE CONVENTION IN CANADIAN LAW
The Hague Convention aims to protect children from harms resulting from their 
wrongful removal across borders by providing a procedure to bring about their 
prompt return to the state (country) of their habitual residence.56 Parental child 
abduction occurs when one parent takes a child across national borders and 
retains the child without the consent of the other parent.57 There are currently 
ninety-nine contracting states to the Hague Convention,58 each of whom is 
required to designate a “Central Authority” to act as a contact person, fact finder, 
and decision maker on Hague Convention applications.59 In Canada, Hague 
Convention applications are heard in provincial courts.
The Hague Convention establishes a procedural mechanism implemented by 
the Central Authority that determines if the child should be returned to his or 
her habitual country of residence for the resolution of custodial arrangements 
between the two parents. An applicant for the return of a child must establish 
that the removal or retention of a child: (i) is in breach of rights of custody under 
the law of the state in which the child was habitually resident immediately before 
the removal or retention and (ii) that those rights were actually exercised at the 
time of removal or retention.60
Notwithstanding this, the authority of the state is not bound to order the 
return of the child if the party who opposes its return establishes either that:
the person, institution or other body having the care of the person of the child was 
not actually exercising the custody rights at the time of removal or retention, or 
had consented to or subsequently acquiesced in the removal or retention; or [that] 
there is a grave risk that his or her return would expose the child to physical or 
psychological harm or otherwise place the child in an intolerable situation.61
 The Hague Convention inherently presumes that the wrongful removal is not 
in the interests of the child. This is in line with other international treaties, such 
as the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC), which 
states that “States Parties shall respect the right of the child who is separated from 
56. Hague Convention, supra note 3, preamble.
57. Ibid, art 4.
58. Hague Conference on Private International Law, “Status Table: Convention of 25 October 
1980 on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction” (last updated 2 December 
2017), online: <www.hcch.net/en/instruments/conventions/status-table/?cid=24>. 
As of October 12, 2018, there were ninety-nine contracting states.
59. Hague Convention, supra note 3, c II.
60. Ibid, art 3.
61. Ibid, art 13.
SHELLEY,  THE ExCLUSION TRAp 767
one or both parents to maintain personal relations and direct contact with both 
parents on a regular basis, except if it is contrary to the child’s best interests.”62 
Moreover, because the Hague Convention considers the swift return of the child 
to be in the child’s best interests, states are instructed to “act expeditiously.”63 
This was recently confirmed in a rare SCC statement on the Hague Convention, 
in which the Court sent a clear signal that applications should be judge-led, not 
party-driven.64 The Court went so far as to encourage other Canadian courts to 
take steps to ensure Hague Convention proceedings are flagged and decided using 
the “most expeditious procedures available.”65 For example, article 11 allows an 
applicant to request a statement of reasons for the delay if an authority does not 
reach a decision within six weeks from the date the proceedings commence.66 
Such expediency is in direct contrast to the timeline for refugee claims, which can 
take years to resolve.
II. METHODOLOGY AND LIMITATIONS
Having charted the legal context for this article, in this part, I lay out the analytical 
context by explaining the methodology used to approach this issue by means of 
publicly available Federal Court and IRB decisions. I also address the limitations 
inherent in the small sample available.
A. METHODOLOGY
In my review of the literature, I was not able to find academic literature that 
looked at the issue of exclusion from refugee status of women who had fled 
domestic violence and were excluded on the basis of child abduction.67 Moreover, 
I did not find any studies that investigated exclusion on the basis of the serious 
non-political crime of child abduction in Canada.
Ideally, to better understand this issue, I would empirically investigate how 
decision makers were addressing the 1(F)(b) exclusion on the basis of child 
abduction in the context of domestic violence. This would entail looking at 
how the Gender Guidelines were understood and applied in such cases, if and 
62. Convention on the Rights of the Child, 20 November 1989, 1577 UNTS 3 art 9(3) (entered 
into force 2 September 1990).
63. Hague Convention, supra note 3, art 11.
64. Office of the Children’s Lawyer v Balev, 2018 SCC 16 at para 89, [2018] 1 SCR 398.
65. Ibid.
66. Hague Convention, supra note 3, art 11.
67. As previously stated, an article addressing this topic was published while this article was in its 
final stages of editing. Hayman, supra note 6.
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how interactions with Hague Convention applications were addressed, the effect 
of variables such as country of origin or type of persecution, and, ultimately, 
whether there was inconsistent decision making. However, due to the small 
volume of publicly available cases, this is not possible.
The study was limited to cases occurring during the seventeen-year period 
from 1 January 2000 to 31 December 2017. Notably, this study includes cases 
occurring both before and after the 15 December 2012 legislative changes. The 
legal databases used for this study were the Canadian Legal Information Institute 
(CanLII), WestLaw, and Quicklaw databases of English-language decisions by 
the Refugee Protection Division (RPD), Refugee Appeal Division (RAD), and 
Federal Court decisions. The search terms were designed to yield IRB and Federal 
Court decisions in which the issue of exclusion pursuant to 1(F)(b) was raised in 
the context of child abduction for women. It included search terms such as “1(F)
(b),” “exclusion,” “abduction,” and “woman.”
Once compiled, I conducted an initial review to identify cases where 
decisions were available at multiple decision-making levels and to screen out 
cases that did not fit the focus of the study (such as those involving male refugee 
claimants or refugee claims based on fears of abduction). I ultimately identified 
fourteen relevant cases, with seventeen total decisions (see Table 1) where the 
issue of exclusion under 1(F)(b) on the basis of child abduction was raised for 
women who based their refugee claim on domestic violence. I identified seven 
additional cases from the same time period where the 1(F)(b) exclusion was 
raised on the basis that the claimant had committed the serious non-political 
crime of child abduction, but where the claim was based on grounds other than 
domestic violence.68 Countries of origin comprised Mexico, Hungary, Venezuela, 
Germany, Peru, Cameroon, Nigeria, Guyana, Algeria, the USA, Honduras, 
China, and Pakistan.
This small number is perhaps unsurprising given that the IRB publishes very 
few of its decisions.69 It follows that this small number likely does not accurately 
reflect the frequency with which the issue is being raised in IRB decision making.
68. Re MVL, [2000] CRDD No 35 (QL); Re UCR, [2001] CRDD No 94 (QL); TB1-19163, 
[2015] RPDD No 290 (QL); TB5-08633, [2015] RPDD No 150 (QL); TB4-09799, 
[2015] RPDD No 281 (QL); TB5-05541, [2015] RADD No 802 (QL); AB v Canada, 
supra note 38. I also found one case where the 1(F)(b) exclusion was raised by a male refugee 
claimant, though this was not within my search parameters. See Re YLH, [2006] RPDD No 
238 (QL) [Re YLH].
69. Arbel, supra note 4 at 746.
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TABLE 1
Year RPD RAD Federal Court
2002 Re XEB*70
2003 Re SAE†71
2004 Kovacs v Canada72
2005 Paris Montoya v Canada73
Kovacs v Canada74
Montoya v Canada75
2011 Re X (TA7-10286)76
2012 Re X (TB1-14175)^77
2013 Re X (TB3-04775)78
2014 Re X (TB4-01471)
79






Puerto Rodriguez v 
Canada85
2016 Re X (TB4-00407)86
TOTAL 9 4 4
* Domestic violence forming basis of claim alleged against claimant’s former, not 
current, spouse.
† Minister withdrew position on issue of 1(F)(b) exclusion on the basis of the crime of 
child abduction. 
^1(F)(b) not explicitly mentioned; however, the decision maker raised the issue of the claimant’s 
alleged child abduction.
70. Re XEB, [2002] RPDD No 230 (QL) [Re XEB].
71. Re SAE, [2003] RPDD No 13 (QL) [Re SAE].
72. Kovacs v Canada (RPD), supra note 1.
73. Paris Montoya v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2005] RPDD No 320 
(QL) [Paris Montoya v Canada (RPD)].
74. Kovacs v Canada, supra note 1.
75. Montoya v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2005 FC 1674, 294 FTR 41 
[Montoya v Canada].
76. TA7-10286, [2011] RPDD No 501 (QL) [TA7-10286].
77. TB1-14175, [2012] RPDD No 520 (QL) [TB1-14175].
78. TB3-04775, [2013] RADD No 411 (QL) [TB3-04775].
79. TB4-01471, [2014] RADD No 1045 (QL) [TB4-01471].
80. TB3-09317, [2014] RADD No 677 (QL) [TB3-09317].
81. Aissa, supra note 47.
82. TB2-09187, [2015] RPDD No 4 (QL) [TB2-09187].
83. TB4-01282, [2015] RPDD No 279 (QL) [TB4-01282].
84. TB4-12679, [2015] RPDD No 117 (QL) [TB4-12679].
85. Puerto Rodriguez v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2015 FC 1360, 262 
ACWS (3d) 188 [Puerto Rodriguez v Canada].
86. TB4-00407, [2016] RADD No 352 (QL) [TB4-00407].
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B. LIMITATIONS
Given the small size of this sample, an empirical analysis is not feasible. As such, 
my aim is to illustrate troubling trends, assumptions made by decision makers, 
and key themes in this context, with the goal of bringing them to light in order 
that they may be explored further in future research.
There is one additional limitation that stems from the lack of published 
decisions. Not only may use of the 1(F)(b) exclusion on the basis of child 
abduction be occurring at a greater rate than is reflected in this sample, but it 
is possible that more women are successful at rebutting this charge than is seen 
here. In the selected sample, nearly every time the 1(F)(b) exclusion was raised, 
the claimant was excluded on that basis. However, given that positive RPD 
decisions were not accompanied by written reasons for much of the period of the 
study, it is possible that this does not actually reflect the success rate of the 1(F)
(b) exclusion analysis.
III. EXCLUSIONS, INTERSECTIONS, AND IMPOSSIBLE 
SITUATIONS
I now turn to a consideration of the themes, patterns, and inconsistencies emerging 
from this small body of case law. In doing so, I draw upon the existing literature 
on domestic violence, refugee claims, and the Hague Convention discussed above. 
I discuss how decision makers have used the Gender Guidelines, conducted 
credibility assessments, and addressed interplay between Hague Convention 
applications and refugee claims. Finally, I analyze the lack of consistency in the 
jurisprudence and the ramifications of this for women in this precarious situation.
A. THE CHANGING USE OF THE HAGUE CONVENTION
The Hague Convention was originally enacted to address “a pattern of 
parental abduction across international borders to thwart or preempt custody 
arrangements in one country and seek a more advantageous setting for litigating 
custody issues in another.”87 Drafters did not include reference to domestic 
violence against a spouse.88 Rather, the abduction of a child was perceived to 
87. Shani M King, “The Hague Convention and Domestic Violence: Proposals for Balancing the 
Policies of Discouraging Child Abduction and Protection Children from Domestic Violence” 
(2013) 47:2 Family LQ 299 at 299.
88. Williams, supra note 5 at 44.
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be in itself a form of domestic violence—one perpetrated on the part of the 
abducting, non-custodial father.89
The situation is very different today. Studies have found that “sixty-five 
percent to seventy percent of international family abductors were female, and 
usually mothers.”90 Moreover, there is evidence that the majority of return 
cases are brought by men against women.91 Tension exists between the goals of 
preventing international child abduction and the protection of women who flee 
situations of violence with their children, who are, in many instances, protecting 
their children from abuse.
This tension manifests in a number of ways. For the woman who has 
“abducted” her children away from a situation of domestic violence, a return 
order subjects her to the potential for “additional and greater violence.”92 She 
faces the choice of letting the child or children return alone to a parent who 
has previously exhibited violence or returning with the child to confront the 
potential resumption of the abuse.93 While the Hague Convention specifically 
provides that decisions made pursuant to it concerning a child’s return “shall not 
be taken to be a determination on the merits of any custody issue,”94 this ignores 
the fact that the return of a child under certain circumstances could be a de facto 
custody decision if the woman is not able to return for her own safety.
In addition, as stated above, the Hague Convention mechanism is designed to 
enable the rapid return of the “abducted” child. It directs states to “use the most 
expeditious procedures available.”95 For a woman who is the respondent to a 
Hague claim in the midst of a refugee claim, this emphasis on speed has significant 
repercussions. The issue of whether an order under the Hague Convention for the 
immediate return of a child can be made whilst there is a pending claim on the 
child’s behalf for status as a Convention refugee was considered in Kovacs v Kovacs.96 
89. Ibid at 42.
90. Julia Alanen, “When Human Rights Conflict: Mediating International Parental Kidnapping 
Disputes Involving the Domestic Violence Defense” (2008) 40:1 U Miami Inter-Am L 
Rev 49 at 53-54.
91. Nigel Lowe, “A Statistical Analysis of Applications Made in 2008 Under the Hague 
Convention of 25 October 1980 on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction: 
Part I” (November 2011), online: <www.hcch.net/en/publications-and-studies/
details4/?pid=5421&dtid=32>. Lowe reports that “69% of taking persons were mothers” and 
“28% of the taking persons were fathers.”
92. Williams, supra note 5 at 52.
93. Ibid at 58.
94. Hague Convention, supra note 3, art 19.
95. Ibid, art 2.
96. Kovacs v Kovacs, supra note 1.
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This case concerned Miklosne Kovacs, who entered Canada on 29 March 2001 
and claimed refugee protection for herself and her two minor children. The claim 
was based on fear of persecution by reason of physical and psychological abuse 
at the hands of the Ms. Kovacs’s husband.97 In quick succession, Mr. Kovacs was 
granted a divorce and custody of one of the children98 by a Hungarian Court 
(June 2001) and subsequently commenced a Hague Convention application for 
the immediate return of his son, Gergo, in July 2001.99
The judge in Kovacs v Kovacs, summarizing the procedural timelines at that 
time, noted that Hague applications in the Ontario Superior Court of Justice can 
usually be completed in three to four months, while “[t]he refugee determination 
process to the completion of a hearing usually takes about a year.”100 The court held 
that the Hague Convention was “not impaired, qualified or rendered inoperative 
by the [IRPA] under the doctrine of paramountcy.”101 Thus, an order under the 
Hague Convention for the immediate return of a child is not delayed pending 
a decision of refugee status. Women who have fled domestic violence with 
their children can have their children forcibly removed to their abuser despite 
a pending refugee application on the grounds of that same domestic violence.
Moreover, information and findings in a Hague Convention application can 
be used in a subsequent refugee claim process. Ultimately, the court in Kovacs 
v Kovacs found that the removal and retention of Gergo was wrongful.102 This 
finding was based primarily on the finding that the allegations of abuse were 
not credible—the court cited lack of medical evidence, police reports, and other 
physical evidence to substantiate the years of alleged severe physical abuse.103 
There was no discussion of the effects of trauma, social or cultural context, 
or gender-specific evidentiary concerns in the credibility assessment in the 
decision. The Hague Convention application ultimately failed not because of 
any concerns over domestic violence, but because of the criminal activities of 
Mr. Kovacs. The court held that “to accede to the applicant’s position on this 
application would now effectively mean that Gergo would be returned to a father 
97. Ibid at para 14.
98. The other child who entered Canada with Ms. Kovacs was a child of Ms. Kovacs’s previous 
marriage and was not the subject of any claim by the applicant.
99. Kovacs v Kovacs, supra note 1 at paras 11-13.
100. Ibid at para 72.
101. Ibid at para 150.
102. Ibid at para 153.
103. Ibid at paras 170-83.
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who is a fugitive from justice. He would, if returned to his father’s care, be in an 
environment which would present a risk of psychological harm.”104
Two years later, in 2004, the RPD determined that Ms. Kovacs and her 
children were neither Convention refugees nor persons in need of protection. Ms. 
Kovacs was excluded from refugee protection pursuant to article 1(F)(b) of the 
Refugee Convention on the basis that there were “serious reasons for considering” 
that she had committed the serious non-political crime of abducting her son.105 
In reaching this decision, the RPD relied on Kovacs v Kovacs, despite the fact 
that the court had only reached a finding that the removal and retention of 
Gergo was wrongful, not a finding that Ms. Kovacs had committed the crime of 
abduction.106 The RPD’s decision was upheld in 2005, where the Federal Court 
found that the RPD was entitled to take the findings of the court in Kovacs v 
Kovacs into account.107 Per the Federal Court, the Ontario court’s decision in the 
Hague Convention application was not binding, but was “relevant and important 
evidence that places the applicants’ claim in context” and the Ontario Superior 
Court of Justice’s findings should be taken into account where they are directly 
relevant to the facts before the IRB.108 The Federal Court did specify that the 
IRB is still required to carry out its own analysis and “cannot be bound by the 
actions of the [Ontario Superior Court of Justice], particularly where the issues 
and questions are different.”109 This set a precedent that has been upheld in 
subsequent refugee cases where a prior Hague Convention application is in play, 
most notably in AB v Canada.110
Similarly to Kovacs v Canada, AB v Canada dealt with a refugee claim 
made by a Roma woman from Hungary who had travelled to Canada with her 
children. AB v Canada and its underlying RPD decision also considered the 
effects of the Hague Convention and a return order on a subsequent 1(F)(b) 
analysis. However, in AB v Canada, the principal applicant based her claim for 
protection on discrimination and persecution because of her Roma ethnicity, 
104. Ibid at para 235.
105. Kovacs v Canada, supra note 1 at para 2.
106. Ibid at paras 20-21.
107. Ibid at para 10. Specifically, the Federal Court held that, because the court in Kovacs v Kovacs 
was not required to address the issue of criminal abduction, the RPD did not err in relying 
on that decision despite the fact that Justice Ferrier did not make a specific finding that 
Gergo had been abducted by his mother (ibid at paras 20-21).
108. Ibid.
109. Ibid.
110. Jesurasa v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2005] RPDD No 279 (QL); 
Re YLH, supra note 68; AB v Canada, supra note 38.
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rather than domestic violence.111 The principal applicant entered Canada with 
her eldest child, who was the subject of contested custody proceedings in 
Hungary.112 In December 2011, a Hungarian court ordered the child’s return 
to her father’s custody.113 On 30 November 2012, the child’s father obtained a 
Hague Convention return order from the Ontario Court of Justice.114
At the subsequent RPD proceedings, the applicant was excluded from refugee 
protections on the grounds that there were serious reasons for considering that 
she had committed a serious non-political crime pursuant to article 1(F)(b). The 
RPD member cited Kovacs v Canada for the proposition that the Ontario Court 
of Justice’s Hague Convention decision was relevant to the exclusion analysis and 
quoted extensively from the Ontario Court of Justice’s twenty-two-page decision 
in his reasons:
[The RPD member] appears to have determined that the applicable standard for 
determining if there were serious reasons for considering that the Applicant had 
committed a serious non-political crime outside Canada, prior to her admission 
to Canada as a refugee, was the fact of the existence of the Hague Convention 
and the evidence that confirmed that the Applicant had removed and wrongfully 
retained the child, who was subsequently returned to her father by way of the Hague 
Convention order of the [Ontario Court of Justice].115
In reviewing the RPD decision, the Federal Court concluded that the 
member’s 1(F)(b) exclusion analysis was unreasonable on the grounds that: 
(i) he erred in failing to consider Febles and whether the ten-year sentencing 
presumption had been rebutted and (ii) that “his application of the Jayasekara 
factors was unreasonable.”116 The court found that Jayasekara did “not support 
the proposition that the existence of an international convention, such as the 
Hague Convention, is the sole factor or ‘standard’ against which seriousness 
must be assessed.”117
Ultimately, the court found that while Kovacs v Canada recognizes the Hague 
Convention as a “factor to be considered in determining if child abduction is a 
serious crime for the purposes of Article 1F(b),” it is not determinative. Per the 
court, “it does not support a contention that it is the only factor to be considered, 
that its existence creates a non-rebuttable presumption that child abduction is, 
111. AB v Canada, supra note 38 at paras 12-13.
112. Ibid at para 10.
113. Ibid.
114. Ibid at para 11.
115. Ibid at para 71.
116. Ibid at para 57
117. Ibid at para 81.
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in every case, serious in the context of an Article 1F(b) analysis, or, that it is the 
primary factor to be considered.” 118
Other cases have taken place at the nexus of Hague Convention applications, 
domestic violence, and refugee claims, and fully considering those cases is beyond 
the scope of this article.119 Kovacs v Canada is by no means a perfect model case—
it predates the SCC’s decision in Febles and the IRB had significant credibility 
concerns with regard to Ms. Kovacs. However, Kovacs v Canada is significant, 
both for the precedent it set that Hague Convention decisions are relevant to the 
1(F)(b) exclusion analysis and for the troubling history it relates: after four years 
and decisions from four separate courts and tribunals, the possibility that Ms. 
Kovacs was suffering from trauma that had affected her ability to give testimony 
or had other gender-specific evidentiary concerns never formed part of a 
credibility assessment. While the effects of Kovacs v Canada have been somewhat 
circumscribed by the Federal Court’s subsequent decision in AB v Canada, it still 
exposes dangerous and gendered undercurrents present in this area of law.
B. IMPLEMENTATION AND INHERENT LIMITATIONS OF THE GENDER 
GUIDELINES
My discussion of the Gender Guidelines will proceed in three parts. I first consider 
academic research that has considered the effect of the Gender Guidelines on 
refugee claims in cases involving domestic violence. Next, I examine how the 
Gender Guidelines are being engaged in decisions where the issue of exclusion 
under 1(F)(b) was raised in the context of child abduction for women basing 
their refugee claim on domestic violence. Finally, I consider inherent limitations 
in the Gender Guidelines specific to this context.
It has been twenty-three years since the IRB released the Gender Guidelines. 
In that time, there has been very little information compiled and made public on 
their operation and effectiveness.120 In an effort to fill this knowledge gap, recent 
studies have examined refugee determination cases involving domestic violence 
claims and the application of the Gender Guidelines.
A 2010 study by Constance MacIntosh analyzed all reported RPD decisions 
from 2004–2009 and judicial reviews from 2005–2009 in which a woman sought 
118. Ibid at para 87.
119. Toiber v Toiber (2006), 208 OAC 391, 146 ACWS (3d) 1015; Kubera v Kubera, 2010 BCCA 
118, 3 BCLR (5th) 121; Borisovs v Kubiles (2013), 226 ACWS (3d) 465, 278 CRR (2d) 71 
(Ont Ct J); Suarez v Carranza (2008), 172 ACWS (3d) 145, [2008] WDFL 4883 (BC SC).
120. MacIntosh, supra note 4 at 148, 151.
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protection from spousal violence.121 The study found that domestic violence was 
consistently recognized as a form of persecution that may form the basis of a 
claim for refugee protection.122 However, of the 135 RPD decisions studied, 
132 were rejected.123 Denial was most frequently because the “claimant failed 
to convince the adjudicator that her home state could not protect her from the 
abuser” (64 per cent), followed by a finding that the claimant’s story of domestic 
violence was not credible (34 per cent), a finding that “the claimant had an 
internal flight alternative” (11 per cent), and a finding that “the claimant’s delay 
in seeking protection meant that they did not actually fear the alleged abuse” 
(12 per cent).124 The study found that decision makers often did not engage 
in a substantive or contextual understanding of the evidence in evaluating state 
protection and that assessments of state protection by the RPD rarely followed 
the directives of the Gender Guidelines.125
Building on this research, Efrat Arbel, in a 2013 study, aimed to 
evaluate “whether the Guidelines’ goal of encouraging a gender-sensitive 
refugee-determination has been meaningfully realized in cases involving domestic 
violence.”126 She surveyed 528 reported refugee determination cases involving 
claims of domestic violence.127 Consistent with MacIntosh’s findings, Arbel also 
found that “adjudicators consistently recognized domestic violence as persecution 
for the purposes of the refugee analysis.”128 Arbel’s research uncovered a low 
acceptance rate for the refugee claims: Within 528 cases reported, there was an 
acceptance rate of roughly 20 per cent.129 Similar to MacIntosh, Arbel found that, 
in domestic violence cases, “adjudicators’ determinations generally hinged on the 
state-protection analysis.”130 She found that “[m]ost of the unsuccessful cases 
were rejected on the grounds that the claimant could not prove a failure of state 
protection, did not advance sufficiently credible evidence, or lacked credibility.”131
121. Ibid at 151.
122. Ibid at 153.
123. Ibid at 152.
124. Ibid.
125. Ibid at 153-54.
126. Arbel, supra note 4 at 731.
127. Ibid at 746.
128. Ibid at 753.
129. Ibid at 746.
130. Ibid at 756.
131. Ibid at 746.
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In the cases reviewed for this article, the decision maker explicitly considered 
the Gender Guidelines roughly half of the time, though the frequency varied with 
the level of decision maker (see Table 2). 
TABLE 2: GENDER GUIDELINES MENTIONED?
Yes, in multiple 
paragraphs
Yes, in one discrete 
paragraph No
Federal Court Aissa v Canada132
Kovacs v Canada133
Montoya v Canada134
Puerto Rodriguez v 
Canada135













TOTAL 3 6 8
Looking at engagement with the Gender Guidelines, a few patterns emerge. 
First, reference to the Gender Guidelines was frequently treated in a discrete 
paragraph, separate from the main progression of the decision maker’s argument—a 
blanket paragraph generally recognizing the applicability of the Gender Guidelines. 
For example, the following passage from RPD TB1-14175 reads:
132. Aissa, supra note 47.
133. Kovacs v Canada, supra note 1.
134. Montoya v Canada, supra note 75.
135. Puerto Rodriguez v Canada, supra note 85.
136. TB3-04775, supra note 78.
137. TB4-01471, supra note 79.
138. TB3-09317, supra note 80.
139. Re XEB, supra note 70.
140. Kovacs v Canada, supra note 1.
141. TA7-10286, supra note 76.
142. TB1-14175, supra note 77.
143. TB2-09187, supra note 82.
144. TB4-12679, supra note 84.
145. Paris Montoya v Canada (RPD), supra note 73.
146. Re SAE, supra note 71.
147. TB4-01282, supra note 83.
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In making the assessment in this case, I considered the Chairperson’s Gender 
Guidelines to ensure that warranted accommodations were made in terms of 
questioning the female claimant, the overall hearing process and analysis of claims.148
Other decision makers give more information about how the Gender 
Guidelines informed their thinking. In RPD TB2-09187, the RPD stated:
The [Guidelines] were taken into account when considering the process of the hearing 
and the facts in this case. All relevant factors, such as the social and cultural context 
in which the claimant found herself, along with the issue of state protection and 
changing country conditions were examined with consideration of the [Guidelines]. 
Given the sensitive nature of the allegations, I am cognizant of the difficulties faced 
by the claimant in establishing her claim, including the challenge of remembering 
difficult and emotionally charged events, and as a result, addressed the claimant with 
heightened sensitivity and avoided unnecessary detail when asking questions.149
From these descriptions, it is difficult to know how and to what extent the 
decision maker engaged with the Gender Guidelines. This echoes the findings of 
Shauna Labman and Catherine Dauvergne in their analysis of how the Gender 
Guidelines were raised on judicial review at the Federal Court of Canada.150 They 
found that Federal Court judges often turned to one of two common patterns in 
tackling the Gender Guidelines: (i) the idea that the Gender Guidelines are not a 
“cure-all” for credibility or evidentiary deficiencies, and (ii) the idea that the IRB 
must pay more than “lip-service” to the Gender Guidelines in assessing a claim. 
Labman and Dauvergne state that:
It is often hard to gauge with unsuccessful judicial reviews whether the appellant has 
simply thrown in the Gender Guidelines arguments as a last-ditch, catch-all appeal 
or whether the complexity of the gender arguments are appreciated by certain judges 
and lost on others. Most likely, both realities are at play.151
Other issues were also present in the cases surveyed. For example, despite 
the Gender Guidelines’ instructions that decision makers should consider human 
rights instruments and norms, neither decision excerpted above mentions 
human rights instruments. This is consistent with Arbel’s research, as she found 
that adjudicators seldom made reference to human rights in domestic violence 
cases.152 The Gender Guidelines also dictate consideration of the “social, cultural, 
religious, and economic context” in deciding whether it is unreasonable for the 
148. TB1-14175, supra note 77 at para 3.
149. TB2-09187, supra note 82 at para 14.
150. Labman & Dauvergne, supra note 45.
151. Ibid at 270-71.
152. Arbel, supra note 4 at 753.
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claimant not to have sought state protection.153 In the two decisions excerpted 
above, the first (RPD TB1-14175) does not reference social, cultural, religious, 
or economic context beyond a brief mention of the existence of a national 
“Women’s Emergency Program” that seeks to “address the legal, psychological, 
social and medical problems facing victims of domestic violence.”154 This reference 
comes in the section on state protection—there is no mention of contextual 
factors in the discussion of the claimant’s efforts to seek the protection of the 
state.155 Similarly, in RPD TB2-09187, the consideration of religious, economic, 
and cultural factors is introduced in the section assessing the claimant’s internal 
flight option and potential barriers to relocation.156 All of this is despite the 
fact that both decision makers purportedly considered the Gender Guidelines in 
their assessments. These omissions reflect the outcomes of MacIntosh’s research 
findings and fulfill Audrey Macklin’s prediction that:
By failing to consider the way gender affects both the availability of the internal 
flight alternative and the ability of sexually abused women to return to their 
communities, the Guidelines leave gaps that have the potential of being filled with 
sexist assumptions that ultimately subvert the spirit and intent of the Guidelines.157
I now turn to a discussion of some of the limitations inherent to the Gender 
Guidelines that play out in the situations examined in this article. First, the Gender 
Guidelines are limited by how they conceptualize domestic violence. There is 
no explicit recognition within the text of the Gender Guidelines that domestic 
violence can extend beyond physical abuse, though note 18 states that domestic 
violence “may involve mental and physical suffering.”158 The Gender Guidelines 
do explicitly recognize in their text that “women who have been subjected to 
domestic violence may exhibit a pattern of symptoms referred to as Battered 
Woman Syndrome and may also be reluctant to testify.”159
Thus, there is no recognition of the coercive control model of violence—“a 
pattern of domination that includes tactics to isolate, degrade, exploit and control 
153. Gender Guidelines, supra note 7, s C.
154. TB1-14175, supra note 77 at para 44.
155. Ibid at paras 24-37.
156. TB2-09187, supra note 82 at para 78.
157. MacIntosh, supra note 4 at 151; Audrey Macklin, “Refugee Women and the Imperative of 
Categories” (1995) 17 Hum Rts Q 213 at 251.
158. Gender Guidelines, supra note 7, n 18.
159. Ibid, s D.
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[women] as well as to frighten them or hurt them physically.”160 While the 
recognition of mental suffering is a step in the right direction, it is not adequate to 
fully represent the experience of women in these situations nor the tactics that are 
used by abusers. The extent to which female refugee claimants experience coercive 
control is not known, nor is it known how a court would treat a claim brought 
solely on the basis of coercive control (with no elements of physical violence). 
All of the cases reviewed by MacDonald and Arbel involved some element of 
physical or sexual violence.161 According to Stark, “[t]here is mounting evidence 
that the level of ‘control’ in abusive relationships is a better predictor than prior 
assaults of future sexual assault and of severe and fatal violence.”162 By depicting 
domestic violence so narrowly, the Gender Guidelines establish incorrect criteria 
by which to assess women’s refugee claims based on domestic violence and risk 
excluding women at high risk of violence.
An example of the type of coercive control that is absent from the Gender 
Guidelines is found in Aissa:
Finally, it seems to me that one of the weakest aspects of the female applicant’s 
testimony was the control her husband exercised over her. On the one hand, the 
female applicant described her husband as an absentee man, a man who showed 
up at her home only two weekends per month, a man who wanted to get rid of her 
by sending her to Canada and who did not take care of his children. On the other 
hand, the female applicant stated that her husband exercised excessive control over 
her, that she could not listen to music, that she could not go out, that she had to 
wear a hijab, that she could not take her children to school or to the doctor. Even 
in an attempt to reconcile these different versions, I am of the view that the RPD’s 
decision is reasonable.163
This passage also underlines the fact that decision makers lack understanding 
of this pattern of abuse—a lack of understanding that could be addressed through 
an update of the Gender Guidelines. Indeed, Labman and Dauvergne identify a 
number of cases where the Federal Court expressed frustration with the IRB’s 
failure to appreciate the nature of domestic violence.164 Ultimately, they conclude 
160. Evan Stark, “Re-Presenting Battered Women: Coercive Control and the Defense of Liberty” 
(Paper delivered at the International Conference on Violence Against Women: Complex 
Realities and New Issues in a Changing World, Montreal, 2012) online: <www.stopvaw.org/
uploads/evan_stark_article_final_100812.pdf>.
161. MacIntosh, supra note 4 at 151; Arbel, supra note 4 at 746.
162. Stark, supra note 160 at 4.
163. Aissa, supra note 47 at para 71.
164. Labman & Dauvergne, supra note 45 at 272-73.
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that, even decades after their introduction, the Gender Guidelines “too often fail 
in their effort to guide gender-sensitive decision-making.”165
A second shortcoming of the Gender Guidelines is their categorical failure to 
address the 1(F)(b) exclusion. The goal of the Gender Guidelines is to promote 
a gender-sensitive determination of refugee status. By failing to address the 
exclusion clause, the Gender Guidelines fail to address a critical precursor to that 
determination and create a loophole through which a woman could be excluded 
from refugee status with no contextual or gender-sensitive analysis. While many 
of the decisions I looked at did consider the Gender Guidelines, this is a function 
of the fact that many of the decision makers went on to consider the inclusive 
refugee determination in addition to their exclusion analysis. Because of this 
overlap, adjudicators considered the Gender Guidelines in cases where the 1(F)
(b) exclusion was an issue. However, they were under no legal obligation to do 
so. Therefore, there is no requirement to take a gender-sensitive approach to 
assessing defences, mitigating circumstances, or other factors around making a 
determination of a serious non-political crime, even when the crime in question 
is closely linked to a gender-related persecution, such as domestic violence. This 
is a serious flaw.
C. CREDIBILITY ASSESSMENTS AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
In order for anyone to be successful in a refugee claim, they must give a plausible 
account of the persecution they are facing. In the case of women who have escaped 
with their children from situations of domestic violence, they must account for 
the violence and abuse that form the foundation of their claim. Where the issue 
of exclusion has been raised either by the decision-making body or the Minister, 
they must also account for what drove them to escape with their children.166 
In this analysis, decision makers often have little corroborating evidence to work 
with and must assess women’s credibility, which is “largely a subjective response, 
involving a reliance on assumptions about human behaviour, judgements, 
attitudes, and how a truthful account is presented.”167 There is a significant body 
of literature around the myriad problems in credibility analysis, including, inter 
alia, problematic and stereotyping assumptions, language barriers, failure to 
165. Ibid at 282.
166. See Part II(D) for a discussion of inconsistencies in this regard.
167. Jane Herlihy, Kate Gleeson & Stuart Turner, “What Assumptions about Human Behaviour 
Underlie Asylum Judgments?” (2010) 22:3 Intl J Refugee L 351 at 351.
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recognize and address the effects of trauma, and the vulnerability of memory.168 
Moreover, cultural and imperialist assumptions also govern the perspective of a 
woman refugee claimant’s credibility, given the transnational context. Assessments 
are made within the “dominant cultural and imperialist perception that nations 
of the First World are humanitarian havens” to those seeking asylum.169 As Razack 
has established, “[t]he case of gender-based persecution appears to go more 
smoothly when the cultural context can be ‘anthropologized’ – that is, presented 
as non-Western, inferior, and usually barbaric towards women.”170
There are also issues specific to women and to social perceptions of domestic 
violence that can play a role in how a female refugee claimant’s credibility is 
evaluated. One example is the fact that women are viewed critically if they do not 
leave the abusive relationship at what appears to the decision maker to have been 
the first available opportunity. For example, the court in Aissa questions:
Moreover, why did the female applicant return to her husband in 2010 when she 
was in Canada if, as she alleges, her husband was so abusive that she ran away from 
him? This behaviour cannot be reasonably explained.171
Similarly, the RPD’s decision in RPD TB2-09187 makes the following 
analysis of the claimant’s behaviour:
The claimant travelled to the US in XXXX 2009 [sic]. According to her testimony, she 
did not make a claim for protection while she was there. ... I find that the claimant’s 
behaviour in not applying for asylum in the US is behaviour not consistent with 
someone genuinely fearing return to a place of persecution.172
In these examples, the women’s behaviours are being evaluated through the 
perspective of the adjudicator. Women who continued to live in a place where 
they experienced abuse were seen to have undermined their claim and their 
credibility. To quote Herlihy, Gleeson, and Turner, “[c]redible individuals were 
168. See e.g. ibid; Audrey Macklin, “Truth and Consequences: Credibility Determination 
in the Refugee Context” (Paper delivered at the Conference of the International 
Association of Refugee Law Judges, 1998), online <www.refugeestudies.org/
UNHCR/97%20-%20Truth%20and%20Consequences.%20Credibility%20
Determination%20in%20Refugee%20Context.%20by%20Audrey%20Macklin.pdf>; 
Jane Herlihy, Laura Jobson & Stuart Turner, “Just Tell Us What Happened to You: 
Autobiographical Memory and Seeking Asylum” (2012) 26 Applied Cognitive Psychol 661.
169. Melanie Randall, “Refugee Law and State Accountability for Violence Against Women: 
A Comparative Analysis of Legal Approaches to Recognizing Asylum Claims Based on 
Gender Persecution” (2002) 25 Harv Women’s LJ 281 at 307-308 [Randall, “Refugee Law”].
170. Razack, supra note 44 at 84; Randall, “Refugee Law,” supra note 169 at 308.
171. Aissa, supra note 47 at para 66.
172. TB2-09187, supra note 82 at para 63.
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assumed to act in accordance with their fears – assumptions that people behave 
‘rationally’ in the face of danger. This begs the question of whose rationality is 
being applied.”173
In recent decades, Canadian law has increasingly recognized that there is no 
standard response to violence or trauma and that it is inappropriate to use the fact 
that an individual has not adhered to our assumptions of how someone should 
act following a traumatic experience as evidence of a lack of credibility. With 
regard to domestic violence, a key point in the SCC’s groundbreaking discussion 
of battered women syndrome in R v Lavallee was that “it is difficult for the lay 
person to comprehend the battered wife syndrome” and that a common myth 
exists “that battered women are not really beaten as badly as they claim, otherwise 
they would have left the relationship.”174
Decision makers have also failed, on occasion, to grasp the nature of 
coercive control and the fact that it can be a predictor of “future sexual assaults 
and of severe and fatal violence.”175 For example, in Paris Montoya v Canada, 
the claimant based her refugee claim in part on domestic violence, citing verbal 
and emotional mistreatment by her partner.176 A psychological report filed 
stated that the claimant would be subjected to a risk of physical violence.177 The 
RPD member found that this was contradictory, because the claimant had not 
previously experienced physical or sexual violence, finding:
[In] her narrative, as previously mentioned, she wrote that she had been mistreated; in 
her testimony, she stated that she had been the victim of verbal abuse, humiliations, 
etc. In her testimony, however, she does not state, for all practical purposes, that she 
was raped.
It should also be pointed out that the psychological report ... makes no mention of 
rape or of physical violence. Rather, the psychologist states that the claimant would 
be subjected to a risk of physical violence. It is true, as the claimant’s counsel points 
out, that the word ‘violence’ is not limited to physical violence, but I must consider 
why this aspect of the testimony is contradictory.178
The panel’s decision was found to be reasonable.179
173. Herlihy, Gleeson & Turner, supra note 167 at 358.
174. R v Lavallee, [1990] 1 SCR 852 at 889, [1990] 4 WWR 1.
175. Stark, supra note 160 at 4.
176. Paris Montoya v Canada (RPD), supra note 73.
177. Ibid at para 29.
178. Ibid at paras 28-29.
179. Montoya v Canada, supra note 75 at para 31.
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If a woman’s credibility has been impugned, this can have serious consequences 
for her ability to gather persuasive medical evidence of the trauma and violence 
she has experienced. For example, again in RPD TB2-09187, it is stated that:
The claimant provided a number of medical and counselling reports as evidence for 
her claim. … The doctor states the claimant satisfies diagnostic criteria for major 
disorder of moderate severity and chronic post-traumatic stress disorder. I accept 
the diagnosis. I note that the doctor’s opinion is based on evidence provided to him 
by the claimant. Given that the claimant lacks credibility on several pivotal elements 
of her claim, I am unable to conclude that there is a causal relationship between 
the psychologist’s findings and the facts found in the claimant’s request for refugee 
protection. Therefore, I give this medical opinion little evidentiary weight.180
This decision maker’s line of reasoning begs the question of what evidence the 
claimant could ever put forward that would be considered sufficiently persuasive 
in this situation.
D. DEFENCES, CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS, AND OTHER CONSIDERATIONS
What prompts a consideration of the 1(F)(b) exclusion on the basis of the crime of 
child abduction? Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada’s “Enforcement 
Operational Bulletin No. 24” sets out the priorities, strategies, and procedures 
for Ministerial interventions in refugee protection determination processes.181 
ENF-24 dictates:
In cases where children accompanied by a single parent make a refugee protection 
claim—the other parent having remained in the country of nationality or being 
located elsewhere—it is important to establish whether the child was abducted or 
removed from custody in contravention of a custody order. … To determine whether 
a child has been abducted or removed from the custody of a parent, and whether 
it is necessary to invoke exclusion under article 1F(b) of the Refugee Convention, 
officers must consider the following factors:
• the marital status of the parents;
• the age of majority in the country of nationality;
• the need to obtain the consent of both parents or of the legal guardian for the 
child to travel outside of the country of nationality;
• consent by the parent or guardian;
180. TB2-09187, supra note 82 at para 60.
181. Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada, “ENF 24: Ministerial interventions” (18 
March 2016), online: <www.canada.ca/content/dam/ircc/migration/ircc/english/resources/
manuals/enf/enf24-eng.pdf>.
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• a custody order in favour of the other parent;
• a credible defence (see section 285 of the Criminal Code), namely that the 
acts were necessary to protect the child from imminent danger or to allow the 
parent to flee imminent danger; and
• communication between the child and the other parent since the child’s arrival 
in Canada.182
However, on some occasions, the IRB has raised the issue of exclusion on 
the basis of child abduction without prompting by the government. For example, 
in RPD TB1-14175, the RPD panel independently raised the issue of abduction 
as an “area of concern,” noting a discrepancy in the claimant’s testimony over 
whether she had the father’s authorization to leave with the minor claimant.183 
The decision in RPD TB1-14175 states that:
This discrepancy was not posed of the claimant and thus I am unable to draw 
any negative inference; however, I do note that Peru is a party to the 1980 Hague 
Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction. There was no 
evidence to indicate that XXXX, the minor claimant’s father has been looking for 
the minor claimant, nor has there been any application made through the Hague 
Convention with regards to his daughter.184
In at least one case, the RPD made a finding of exclusion despite the fact 
that the Minister took the position at the close of the hearing that “the evidence 
supported a defence to the offence of child abduction and formally withdrew the 
Article 1F(b) allegation” (note that this was found to be acceptable on judicial 
review in the Federal Court).185
The above passage from RPD TB1-14175 also points to another pattern in 
the reviewed decisions. The decision maker in that case took into account the 
fact that there was no activity in the country of origin related to the supposed 
abduction. This reflects the fact that an applicant’s conviction in another 
jurisdiction could be considered sufficient evidence for exclusion, but is neither 
required nor automatically sufficient.186 Decision makers exclude women under 
1(F)(b) where there has not been a criminal conviction or even a criminal charge 
relating to the supposed abduction. One of the Jayasekara factors identified by 
the Federal Court of Appeal is the mode of prosecution, and decision makers 
sometimes consider whether a prosecution has been raised in the country of 
182. Ibid at 24.
183. TB1-14175, supra note 77 at para 23.
184. Ibid.
185. Puerto Rodriguez v Canada, supra note 85 at para 8.
186. Background Note, supra note 32 at para 108.
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origin as part of this analysis.187 However, not all post-Jayasekara decisions in 
the study included a consideration of the Jayasekara factors and sometimes the 
analysis was inadequate.
In RAD decision TB4-01471, the RPD (and later the RAD) found that the 
claimant was excluded under 1(F)(b), despite the fact that there had been no 
complaint from the father of the minor refugee claimants.188 The RAD justified 
this finding that a criminal act had been committed on the evidence that “the 
claimant had testified before the RPD that her husband [was] not aware that 
she left Nigeria with the minor without his knowledge and that he [was] not 
aware that they [were] currently in Canada.”189 This appears to be considered 
as sufficient evidence of a crime in and of itself. Unfortunately, the full RPD 
decision is not publicly available for this case. Consequently, it is not possible 
to know how the RPD dealt with any mitigating factors in this case or if it 
considered the fact that the woman may have left the country with her child as a 
matter of protection or self-preservation. It appears that the RPD had credibility 
concerns that led them to find that there was not sufficient “reliable or probative 
evidence to establish on a balance of probabilities that the claimant was a victim 
of domestic violence,” which likely played a role.190 However, the fact remains 
that the claimant in this case was excluded from refugee status on the basis of the 
crime of child abduction, an offence (i) for which all of the evidentiary record 
was either in another country or dependent on the IRB’s credibility analysis, and 
(ii) that had never been reported or recognized by any other body or individual 
before the IRB.
Finally, in some cases, the decision maker uses the lack of criminal 
proceedings in the country of origin in an entirely opposite way—as evidence that 
the persecution feared by the woman is not credible. Consider the case of RAD 
MB3-03152, which had many of the same features as the decisions previously 
discussed—a woman who, with her two minor children, had left the Turks and 
Caicos Islands and feared that, upon her return, she would be “punished and 
beaten by her husband” and that he could try to take her children.191 Again, the 
full RPD decision is not available; however, from the description in the RAD 
decision, it appears the issue of exclusion on the basis of child abduction was 
187. Jayasekara, supra note 17 at para 44.
188. TB4-01471, supra note 79 at para 10.
189. Ibid at para 30.
190. Ibid at para 41.
191. MB3-03152, [2014] RADD No 286 at para 5 (QL).
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never raised.192 Instead, the RPD found that the fear of losing custody “is not 
objectively substantiated” because “the principal claimant’s husband has taken no 
steps to alert the authorities of an international child abduction.”193
This is a perfect “catch-22” situation. Women whose former abusive 
partners are actively trying to regain control of the child (and are thereby trying 
to regain control of them) through Hague Convention applications and the 
commencement of criminal proceedings can be found to have committed a crime 
of child abduction. Women whose former abusive partners have not made an 
effort to regain control of the child can be found  not to be facing a real threat 
of persecution. Either way, these women will not be successful in their claim for 
refugee status.
Once the elements of a child abduction have been established, IRB 
decision makers will—sometimes—take defences into account. The UNHCR 
acknowledges various criminal defenses, including duress, self-defence, and 
defence of other persons.194 Such defences are limited to situations where the 
incriminating act “results from a threat of imminent death or serious bodily 
harm against that person or another person, and the person acts necessarily 
and reasonably to avoid this threat.”195 In Jayasekara, the court recognized that 
a constraint short of duress may be a relevant mitigating factor in assessing 
the seriousness of the crime committed, alongside harm to the victim, use of 
a weapon, and other relevant factors.196 Moreover, defences of duress and 
self-defence are recognized in Canada, and the Criminal Code contains statutory 
defences specific to the abduction of a young person.197 Section 284 of the 
Criminal Code states that:
No one shall be found guilty of an offence under sections 281 to 283 if he establishes 
that the taking, enticing away, concealing, detaining, receiving or harbouring of any 
young person was done with the consent of the parent, guardian or other person having 
the lawful possession, care or charge of that young person.198
Section 285 of the Criminal Code states that:
No one shall be found guilty of an offence under sections 280 to 283 if the court 
is satisfied that the taking, enticing away, concealing, detaining, receiving or 
192. Ibid at paras 9-10.
193. Ibid at para 9.
194. Background Note, supra note 32 at paras 66, 69-71.
195. Ibid at para 69.
196. Jayasekara, supra note 17 at para 45.
197. Criminal Code, supra note 37, ss 284-86.
198. Ibid, s 284 [emphasis added].
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harbouring of any young person was necessary to protect the young person from danger 
of imminent harm or if the person charged with the offence was escaping from danger 
of imminent harm.199
While section 285 appears at first glance to be an apt way to address the 
dilemma created by women who escape domestic violence with their children, 
there are troubling patterns in the section 285 jurisprudence. First, in the cases 
reviewed for this article, defences were not consistently considered by decision 
makers. Unsurprisingly, given the subject matter of the cases surveyed, the 
most commonly referenced defence was the “imminent harm” defence under 
section 285.200 However, a number of cases failed to consider the availability 
of any defences at all.201 I did not find any cases where duress or self-defence 
were discussed.
Second, the availability of these criminal defences depends on the decision 
maker’s understanding of the nature of domestic violence and judgment of the 
logic and appropriateness of the claimant’s actions. Many of the same concerns 
discussed in the above section on credibility apply. If the decision maker is not 
aware of and sensitive to the coercive control model of violence, the availability of 
these defences will be limited. Indeed, as Jennifer Bond states, feminist scholars 
have argued for decades that a requirement of close temporal proximity for the 
defence of self-defence fails to take into account the realities of domestic violence 
and unjustly restricts the application of the defence.202
For example, in one case involving a woman who allegedly fled with her child 
in order to protect him from her spouse, who presented a danger of imminent 
harm, the RPD panel took into account that the claimant had maintained contact 
with her husband in Honduras while she was residing in the United States.203 Per 
the RPD decision:
The claimant explained that the minor claimant was “always asking to speak to his 
father” and that her husband always found a way to contact the claimant through 
the claimant’s mother who would give him the claimant’s phone number despite 
the claimant changing her phone number. … The claimant explained that did not 
199. Ibid, s 285 [emphasis added].
200. TA7-10286, supra note 76; Paris Montoya v Canada (RPD), supra note 73; Re XEB, supra 
note 70; Kovacs v Canada, supra note 2; TB4-01282, supra note 83; Puerto Rodriguez v 
Canada, supra note 85; TB4-12679, supra note 84; TB4-00407, supra note 86.
201. Aissa, supra note 47; Re SAE, supra note 71; TB1-14175, supra note 77; TB3-04775, supra 
note 78; TB3-09317, supra note 80; TB4-01471, supra note 79.
202. Jennifer Bond, “The Defence of Duress in Canadian Refugee Law” (2016) 41 
Queen’s LJ 409 at 449.
203. TB4-12679, supra note 84 at para 38.
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make other living arrangements because she felt sure her husband would not show 
up at her mother’s home, and because she was unable to work in addition to the 
fact that she gave her mother’s address as the reference address to US immigration 
officials. The panel finds the claimant has not provided a reasonable explanation for 
why did not make further efforts to cut off communication with her husband. … The 
claimant also continued to provide her mother with her telephone number despite 
her mother forwarding the claimant’s phone number to the claimant’s husband. 
The claimant explained that it was because her husband was harassing her mother 
with numerous calls, yet the claimant did not explain to her mother the alleged 
danger the claimant faces from her husband because she did not have that level 
of trust with her mother to confide in such matters. The panel finds it is reasonable 
to expect that if the claimant was escaping from a danger of imminent harm from her 
husband, the claimant would attempt to immediately terminate communication with 
her husband to the extent possible within her means once she arrived in the United States 
and furthermore, to explain to her mother despite their lack of intimacy, that she faces 
a risk of harm in order to stop her mother from forwarding her telephone number.204
The panel found that in “indirectly enabling” her husband with the means to 
seek and maintain communications with her and her child, the claimant’s actions 
indicated that she was not escaping a danger of imminent harm.205
IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A woman should not be forced to choose between protecting her child and 
protecting herself. Moreover, even where there is no direct threat to a child, she 
should not be made to choose between her own safety and her connection to 
and contact with her child. Women refugee claimants who enter Canada with 
their children should be treated fairly. The circumstances around their choice to 
travel with their child should be assessed without reliance on gender and cultural 
stereotypes and with an appreciation of the special circumstances laid out in 
the Gender Guidelines. Possible defences and mitigating circumstances should be 
comprehensively canvassed by IRB decision makers. Findings made by courts with 
regard to Hague Convention return applications should be treated with caution by 
IRB decision makers tasked with refugee claims made by the same parties.
Without these steps, women who claim refugee status in Canada after 
fleeing with their children are faced with an exclusion trap created by domestic 
violence, Canada’s definition of a refugee, and how adjudicators analyze 
these claims, including the seriousness of this “crime,” the use of the Gender 
204. Ibid [emphasis added].
205. Ibid.
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Guidelines, the recognition of defences, and, in some scenarios, the imposition 
of immediate return orders for return of children under the Hague Convention. 
These interlocking and intersecting systems fail these women and place them in 
an untenable position. Unfortunately, the number of women who are in these 
situations is not known. Access to comprehensive statistical data would make 
it possible to place the small sample of available decisions where IRB decision 
makers looked at the 1(F)(b) exclusion on the basis of child abduction into 
context and allow commentators to identify national, transnational, or historical 
trends. Taking a broader look at cases where women’s refugee claim processes 
took place alongside Hague Convention return applications would also provide 
useful insight. Ultimately, it is imperative that we learn more about this situation 
so as to better support women who risk the failure of their refugee claim because 
of their entirely understandable choice to refuse to abandon their children in 
situations of abuse.
